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The primary objective of this thesis was to critically assess the Productive Unit
Resourcing (PUR) system as it is outlined in NAVSUP INSTRUCTION 7000.21A
and as it is being used at Navy Field Contracting Activities (NFCAs). The re-
search was conducted by a review of current literature and exensive interviews with
headquarters and field activity personnel. The research contains a review of PURs
predecessor system, the fixed workyear-cost funding methodology, an explanation of
the PUR process and Procurement Cost Center algorithms, and summaries of the
positive and negative impacts of PUR. Conclusions and recommendations are made
concerning PUR's applicability to Navy Field Contracting Activities. Where specific
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Since the beginning of time, when man has been confronted with tasks to
be accomplished, he has had to concern himself with the fact that he had limited
resources with which to accomplish them. This situation has prompted man to
continually seek out and, where necessary, develop better means of allocating and
using scarce resources.
Often, man's solution to this resource dilemma has been to engineer a new
mechanical device or process which, when implemented, frees up a limited resource
and substitutes a more abundant resource in its place. Two well known examples of
engineered solutions to constrained resource situations include Eli Whitney's cotton
gin and Henry Ford's use of standardized parts and assembly line production in
automobile manufacture [Ref. l:pp. 736,566-568]. These engineered solutions freed
up scarce manpower and material resources.
In addition to engineered solutions, management techniques and methodolo-
gies have also been developed to relieve constrained resource situations. Beginning
with the work of Frederick Taylor and continuing with that of Henri Fayol, Elton
Mayo and others, new management techniques designed to achieve gains in worker
productivity have been introduced [Ref. 2:pp. 3-5]. By applying these new tech-
niques, savings in scarce manpower and financial resources have been obtained.
Today, resources of all kinds including manpower, material and, in particular
financial, remain scarce. Corporate executives in both the public and private sectors
are feeling an ever increasing financial resource squeeze [Ref. 3:p. 8]. The Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) is no exception. NAVSUP, in response to
increasingly constrained financial resources, has developed and implemented a fi-
nancial resource control and allocation system called Productive Unit Resourcing
(PUR).
B. OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this thesis is to critically assess the PUR system as
it is outlined in NAVSUP INSTRUCTION 7000.21A and as it is being used at Navy
Field Contracting Activities (NFCAs). A secondary objective of this research effort
is to obtain a better understanding of the PUR system process and in particular,
the application and use of the Procurement Cost Center algorithm. Finally, it
is envisioned that the results of this assessment will be distributed and reviewed
by appropriate NAVSUP Headquarters and field contracting personnel and that
the PUR system will be modified to reflect recommendations resulting from the
assessment.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In pursuit of the objectives, the following research question was posed: What
have been the positive and negative impacts of the Navy's Productive Unit Resourc-
ing (PUR) system as applied to the Procurement/Contracting Department of Navy
Field Contracting Activities and how might the system be modified to improve its
application?
In support of the primary question, the following secondary questions were
established:
1. What is the PUR system and why was it developed and implemented?
2. What have been the positive impacts/results of PUR on NFCAs?
3. What have been the negative impacts/results of PUR on NFCAs?
4. How might the PUR algorithms be modified to improve PUR applicability at
NFCAs?
5. How might the PUR process be modified to enhance PUR applicability at
NFCAs?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research data was collected from two primary sources. Initially, the researcher
conducted an extensive literature search. In order to familiarize the researcher with
the subject area, custom bibliographies were obtained from the Defense Logistics
Study Information Exchange (DLSIE). Key words/descriptors used to obtain bib-
liographies included: Manpower Management, Manpower Requirements, Personnel
Management, Personnel Resourcing, Resource Management, Productivity Measure-
ment, Production and Budget Formulation.
Literary sources examined included published and unpublished papers, period-
icals, general reference texts and Government publications and reports. A complete
list of literary sources used is contained in the List of References.
Secondly, research data applicable to the specific thesis research objectives
and questions was collected via personal and telephone interviews. Fourteen per-
sons at nine government activities were interviewed. Interviewees were selected
such that both a headquarters and field perspective was obtained. All interviewees
worked directly with PUR, either as headquarters/field activity functional managers
or comptrollers responsible for activity budget preparation. Questions asked were
open ended. Each question was designed to generate a discussion of any opinion
that was expressed.
The researcher would like to acknowledge the tremendous cooperation and
support given by those personnel interviewed. Their frank responses to the many
questions asked have greatly enhanced the validity of this study. A complete list of
personnel interviewed is contained in Appendix A.
E. SCOPE OF STUDY
This study focuses on two specific areas. First, an examination of the generic
PUR process is presented. Secondly, the construction and use of the Procurement
Cost Center algorithm is reviewed. Other cost center algorithms such as Material
and Inventory Control have been excluded from this study because they fall outside
the researcher's area of interest.
In pursuit of information relative to the areas of study, the researcher has
contacted as many Navy Field Contracting Activities as possible. The size, location
and nature of business conducted by the various field contracting activities was of
concern only to the extent that a balance among personnel interviewed was obtained.
Appendix B contains a list of commands from which personnel were interviewed.
Recommendations made as a result of this study which call for modification
of the PUR process and revision of the Procurement Cost Center algorithm are
applicable to the entire NAVSUP field contracting system.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This study consists of five chapters. Chapter I has outlined the objectives of
the study in addition to providing comment on both the scope of the study and
research methodology used.
Chapter II provides a historical perspective of PUR. Discussed are NAVSUP's
pre-PUR resource allocation system, the rational for developing PUR, as well as an
explanation of what PUR is and what it is supposed to accomplish.
Chapter III consists of two main sections. First, the PUR process is explained
in detail. This is then followed by an in-depth explanation of the current Procure-
ment Cost Center algorithm.
Chapter IV is a review, discussion and analysis of data collected during per-
sonnel interviews. Positive and negative impacts of PUR on field activities are
discussed. Also, PUR process and Procurement Cost Center algorithm problems
are examined and analyzed.
Chapter V summarizes the results of the research and presents conclusions
and recommendations. The recommendations, if implemented by NAVSUP, will
facilitate a better understanding of PUR as well as better application of the system
to Navy Field Contracting Activities.
Appendices and a List of References are provided for information and to facil-
itate further research in this area.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PRE-PUR RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In order to better understand the impact of the PUR resourcing methodology,
familiarity with its predecessor system must first be obtained. That is the purpose
of this section.
The resourcing methodology that NAVSUP Headquarters used prior to PUR
was the fixed workyear-cost funding methodology. Under this funding methodology,
each field activity was allocated its financial resources for a fiscal year based on
what it received the previous fiscal year, with appropriate adjustment for total
funds available for allocation by headquarters. These allocated funds made up what
was known as the field activity's "mission funding base" [Ref. 4]. During austere
years, negative adjustments reflecting fewer available financial resources were made
to the activities funding base. Conversely, when defense budgets were expanding,
adjustments were generally positive and reflected growth.
Mission funding bases (levels) could be further augmented to reflect "above
control" items [Ref. 4]. Above control items were those tasks being performed by
the field activities which were not originally funded as part of the mission base and
as such required the obtaining of additional funds. For example, a new initiative
directed by headquarters requiring the shrink wrapping of all material pallets at
Naval Supply Centers after promulgation of their base funding levels, is considered
an above control item. Twice each year NAVSUP field activities would submit
funding requests to headquarters for their above control requirements. Each funding
request detailed exactly what was being done above control, why it was being done
and how much it was expected to cost. Requests were reviewed by the appropriate
NAVSUP headquarters functional manager who either recommended approval or
disapproval to the NAVSUP Comptroller (NAVSUP-01). If funds were available
and the Comptroller concurred in the recommendation, funds were approved and
added to the requesting activities mission funding base.
The mission funding base, plus approved above control requests, comprised all
available funds for the field activity. From these resources activities were expected to
meet all expenses (less those covered by direct customer reimbursement), including
payroll, materials and physical plant. Requests to cover normal operating shortfalls
were made directly to NAVSUP headquarters and were reviewed for need and avail-
ability of funds in a manner similar to above control funding requests. Excess funds
held by field activities were subject to NAVSUP recall and redistribution.
B. RATIONAL FOR DEVELOPING PUR
The rational for developing the PUR system finds its genesis in the major
shortcoming of the fixed workyear-cost funding methodology. As previously dis-
cussed, when budgeting and allocating resources under the fixed workyear-cost fund-
ing methodology, an activity's prior year budget formed the base upon which the
current year budget was built. The base year budget was simply added to or sub-
tracted from to get the current year budget. No attempt was made to build the
current year budget from scratch, that is to "zero base" it [Ref. 4]. The fact that
budgets were not zero based annually was seen by the NAVSUP Comptroller and
functional managers as the major shortcoming of the fixed workyear-cost funding
methodology, PUR was developed to correct that shortcoming.
PUR requires each activity to develop each year's budget from the ground
up. As will be explained in more detail in Chapter III, field activities build their
budgets by forecasting annual workload (units to be produced) and then negotiate
a rate (payment per unit worked) to be applied against each unit of work actually
accomplished. The product of the forecasted workload units and negotiated rate is
the planned activity budget. Thus, PUR was designed to eliminate the dependency
that existed between a current and past activity budget, a dependency that was a
key fixture of the fixed workyear-cost funding methodology.
C. WHAT IS PUR
As discussed in the introduction to this work, PUR was developed in mid- 1985
as NAVSUP's reaction to the financial resource squeeze being felt within the United
States Government and in particular the Department of Defense. PUR was to be
NAVSUP's primary means of managing its allocated Operation and Maintenance,
Navy (0 Sz M,N) budget dollars for selected field activities. As developed, PUR
provided financial resource control and a means of equitably distributing budget
dollars by linking funding for NAVSUP field activities to actual output produced in
the workplace [Ref. 5:p. 1].
PUR is governed by its own instruction (NAVSUP INSTRUCTION 7000.21 A,
PRODUCTIVE UNIT RESOURCING AT NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COM-
MAND (NAVSUP) FIELD ACTIVITIES), which clearly defines the roles and re-
sponsibilities of headquarters personnel and also those of Naval Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUP) field activity personnel governed by the instruction. The in-
struction also outlines procedures and defines key terms and concepts. Enclosure
(3) of the instruction contains specific information peculiar to the Procurement Cost
Center. This enclosure defines exactly what the Procurement Cost Center is, the
functions this cost center provides, the rate determination process and the calcula-
tions of large and small purchase productive units. General PUR procedures, terms
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and concepts as well as those specifically applicable to procurement will be discussed
in detail in the following chapter.
D. PURPOSE OF PUR
As outlined in Morris [Ref. 6:p. 1], the NAVSUP developers of the PUR
system identified five basic purposes or goals for the system. These purposes are:
• Providing headquarters with a better way to measure the workload-funding-
productivity relationship.
• Providing headquarters with a decision and performance review process capa-
ble of:
— Comparing activity performance to negotiated plan,
— Improving NAVSUP credibility with higher headquarters,
i.e., NAVCOMPT, during budget reviews,
— Permitting NAVSUP functional managers, particularly NAVSUP-02 (Pro-
curement/Contracting), to compare performance of cognizant field activ-
ities for the purpose of transferring workload.
• Providing headquarters a means of generating funding for the accomplishment
of Strategic Plan initiatives.
• Providing field activities a means of identifying and rewarding employee per-
formance.
• Providing field activities with a mechanism for funding workload increases
without going through the process of requesting additional funds from head-
quarters.
It should be noted that the order of presentation of the above listed purposes
does not in any way connote priority or relative importance of the particular purpose
or goal. Each of these purposes will now be examined in detail.
1. The Workload-Funding-Productivity Relationship
Under the fixed workyear-cost funding method of allocating resources,
NAVSUP had no means by which it could measure the relationship between work-
load, funding and productivity. Headquarters had no quantifiable way of answering
questions such as: Assuming X productivity per worker and Y financial resources
available to pay workers, how much work (output) can be accomplished? It was in-
tended that PUR, by linking workload and funding through a unit-rate connection,
would enable headquarters to answer quantifiably this question and other similar
questions involving workload, funding and productivity.
2. Decision and Performance Review Process
PUR will enable headquarters to compare actual activity performance
to previously submitted plans through the use of activity phasing plans, discussed
in the next chapter. Then by comparison of actual results to plan, management
decisions, e.g., shifting workloads between activities, could be accomplished. Under
the fixed workyear-cost funding methodology, this was not possible. Additionally,
because budgets under PUR are to be zero based each fiscal year, NAVSUP could
better defend annual budget positions to higher authority by using each activities
forecasted workload and negotiated rates as backup. Again, this was not possible
under the prior resourcing methodology.
3. Funding Strategic Plan Initiatives
As developed, PUR would give headquarters a means by which it could
generate funds for new or emerging Strategic Plan initiatives. (These initiatives
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are headquarters conceived programs or projects intended to enhance the entire
NAVSUP organization.) PUR would enable headquarters to capture (claim and
use) a portion of the profits generated by field activities during the course of normal
operations and to use these profits to fund these initiatives. Previously, headquarters
had to expend management reserve funds or specifically designate funds to ensure
financing of new and emerging initiatives.
4. Identifying and Rewarding Employee Performance
PUR, through its quantifiable nature, was also designed to facilitate the
identification of employees performing in a superior manner, as well as providing
command funds with which they could then reward deserving individuals. Em-
ployees who produced more than planned and did so at a cost less than planned,
contributed to the activity's profitability. Profits, those remaining funds equaling
the difference between planned and actual costs, could then be distributed to su-
perior performers as a reward for a job well done. Under the fixed workyear-cost
funding methodology superior employees were usually subjectively identified and
rewards, if made, came from the activity's general operating funds.
5. Internal Mechanism for Funding Workload Increases
Under the fixed workyear-cost funding method of allocating resources, ac-
tivities which experienced unexpected workload increases had to request additional
operating funds from NAVSUP. As previously discussed, these requests were subject
to review for need and availability of funds and may or may not have been approved.
PUR was to eliminate such requests by enabling field activities to generate their own
funds. Under PUR, activities would receive additional funds automatically in their
quarterly allocations. The additional amount received would equal the product of




This chapter has provided necessary insight into the fixed workyear- cost fund-
ing methodology which resulted in the development of PUR. It also defined PUR,
and as well as identified and discussed the purposes of PUR. The following chapter
will explain the PUR process in detail and will also include an in-depth explanation
of current Procurement Cost Center algorithms.
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III. PUR PROCESS AND ALGORITHMS
A. GENERAL
As discussed in Chapter II, the PUR system and the operational responsi-
bilities of those included in PUR are promulgated in NAVSUP INSTRUCTION
7000.21 A. The instruction is applicable to the eight Naval Supply Centers (NSCs),
Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC), Naval Publi-
cations and Forms Center (NPFC), Navy Regional Finance Center (Washington,
D.C.) and finally, the four Naval Regional Contracting Centers (NRCCs). All other
NAVSUP field activities receive separate guidance concerning budget development,
review and execution.
NAVSUP INSTRUCTION 7000.21A contains the generic PUR process and
four enclosures which detail each cost center. The enclosures define the cost cen-
ters and associated productive units, designate technical manager and cost center
manager responsibilities and also include updated charts of accounts for use by field
activities.
This chapter will examine the various responsibilities of NAVSUP and field
activity personnel, the generic PUR process and finally, the specific details of the
Procurement Cost Center.
B. RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER PUR
Overall management of field activity resources is the combined responsibility
of the NAVSUP Comptroller (NAVSUP-01) and also that of the various Cost Center
Managers within NAVSUP. In fulfilling his managerial duties, the Comptroller over-
sees system maintenance, including defining cost accounts and updating the PUR
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instruction when required. The Comptroller also issues budget guidance covering
both development and execution, conducts rate negotiations, and reviews forecasted
workloads and estimates of activity overhead costs. Additionally, he monitors the
status of field activity performance versus plan and initiates quarterly budget ad-
justments for each activity [Ref. 7:p. 7].
The Cost Center Manager (CCM) is a principal assistant to the Comptroller.
As such, the CCM is responsible for the tracking of activity performance against
plan, extrapolating workload, monitoring backlogs and analyzing any workload or
cost variances that develop [Ref. 7:p. 7]. The CCM is assisted in his efforts by a
technical manager assigned to each specific cost center.
The Technical Manager (TM) is an expert in a specific functional area, e.g.,
Automated Data Processing (ADP), Accounting, Physical Distribution, Fuel, Pro-
curement, etc. As such, he evaluates productivity enhancements suggested by the
field, reviews changes in policy utilizing cost-benefit analysis, tracks and assesses
performance quality and finally, makes PUR related recommendations to the CCM
concerning his cognizant functional area [Ref. 7:pp. 8].
Field activity personnel are responsible for implementing PUR as outlined in
NAVSUP INSTRUCTION 7000.21 A. The instruction says that the field activity
must, "... take the initiative to institute measures for productivity and cost reduc-
tion . . . where . . . the PUR system should be the key indicator of resource manage-
ment effectiveness." Management personnel, to include first line supervisors and
foremen, are responsible for work center performance, implementing and monitor-
ing cost reduction measures under PUR and for productivity improvements of their
respective functions [Ref. 7:p. 2].
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C. THE PUR PROCESS
Irrespective of the field activity or the cost center within the activity being
considered, a basic PUR process can be applied. That process consists of four
basic steps. These steps are: (1) Rate Determination, (2) Performance Review, (3)
Performance/Execution and, (4) Adjustment Calculation and Processing. Together
these four steps form the PUR cycle through which an activity develops its budget,
performs its mission and then refines its budget based on performance. Each of
these steps will now be examined.
1. Rate Determination
The rate determination process is the means by which each activity, work-
ing with headquarters, determines what its productive unit rate for the year will be.
The process starts after the NAVSUP Comptroller has received appropriate budget
control guidance from NAVCOMPT. This normally occurs only after NAVCOMPT
is confident that the Federal and Department of Defense budgets are firm and few
other Congressional actions affecting these budgets will occur. This normally occurs
during the mid-summer months, approximately four months prior to the start of the
new fiscal year [Ref. 7:p. 2]. Once the NAVSUP Comptroller has received guid-
ance from NAVCOMPT, he begins to estimate the amount of funds available for
use by field activities. The Comptroller does this by subtracting all funds required
for activities not governed by PUR from his total available resources, as well as
those funds required for headquarters operations, special projects, transportation,
etc. [Ref. 7:p. 3].
Simultaneously, NAVSUP field activities are developing individual busi-
ness plans. Business plans consist of each activity's estimate of overhead costs,
workload in terms of productive units and productive unit rates. NAVSUP policy
dictates that the rate contained in an activity's business plan equal the actual rate
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being experienced, with adjustments for anticipated changes due to pay raises, gains
in efficiency or productivity, and so forth [Ref. 7:p. 3]. Business plans are submit-
ted to headquarters where they are reviewed by functional and cost center managers
and the NAVSUP Comptroller. Headquarters then makes a counter proposal based
on availability of funds and subjective judgment as to the validity of the estimates
provided from the field. Headquarters then offers the field activity the chance to re-
butt. At this point in the rate determination process, verbal negotiations generally
begin.
Interactive negotiations, conducted between the commanding officers of
field activities and the NAVSUP Comptroller, are used to finalize each activity's
productive unit rate. It is at this time that the activities try to support any unique
circumstances that an activity faces which could cause abnormal productive unit
rates to be experienced. These negotiations always occur in Washington, D.C. at
headquarters. Normally, only the commanding officer of a field activity attends the
negotiations, although occasionally, activity comptrollers are also present.
The conclusion of the rate determination process is marked by headquar-
ters issuing each activity its Financial Operating Plan (FOP) letter. This letter
outlines, by function, each activity's projected total productive units to be pro-
duced in the coming year and productive unit rate. These figures represent the
outcome of the rate determination process. The next step in the PUR process is
Performance Review.
2. Performance Review
Within 30 days of receipt of the FOP letter, each activity must submit
to headquarters its Phasing Plan [Ref. 7:p. 4]. The Phasing Plan is central to
this step in the PUR process. The plan breaks down each functional area (cost
center) into monthly increments of anticipated workload and assigns that workload
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a cost rate. It should be noted that NAVSUP recognizes that an activity's rate will
fluctuate over the year as factors affecting the rate change, e.g., staff grade level.
Consequently, individual monthly rates need not exactly match the negotiated yearly
rate, however, the weighted average of the monthly rates must equal the negotiated
yearly rate [Ref. 7:p. 5]. It is against the Phasing Plan that each activity's actual
performance will be measured.
3. Performance/Execution
The CCM reviews each activity's performance against its previously sub-
mitted Phasing Plan on a monthly basis. Variances in units produced, as well as
those variances in the rate, are analyzed for significance in magnitude and trend.
Input for this analysis is provided by each activity in the form of a naval message
report. Message reports are required no later than 15 days after the end of a month
for all cost centers, except Procurement which must submit its report no later than
22 days after months end [Ref. 7:p. 5]. Deviations from plan in either number
of productive units produced or the rate can result in adjustment to an activity's
budget. The adjustment calculation and processing step is the final phase in the
generic PUR process.
4. Adjustment Calculation and Processing
The adjustment calculation and processing step is the means by which
NAVSUP adjusts each activity's budget throughout the fiscal year. As part of the
monthly CCM review, profit/loss calculations are made for each cost center at each
activity. While calculations are done monthly, actual budget adjustments occur
quarterly. Quarterly adjustments reflect the cumulative activity performance over
the prior three months. Profits to be paid out to the activity or moneys to be
recaptured from the activity by NAVSUP are dependent on the number of produc-
tive units actually accomplished and the rate at which they are accomplished as
17








Paid for at Plan/Neg. Rate
Rate
* No Profit Sharing
* Funds for Lapsed Units
Recaptured at Plan/Neg.
Rate
* No Profit Sharing
* Additional Units Paid
at Actual Rate
* Profit Sharing Based
On Approved Ratio for
Planned Units
* Funds for Lapsed Units
Recaptured at Plan/Neg
Rate
* Profit Sharing Based on
Approved Ratio for
Actual Units
1 Relative to Plan/Neg Level
Figure 3.1: PROFIT/LOSS SCENARIOS
compared to plan. Figure 1, reproduced from NAVSUP INSTRUCTION 7000.21 A,
graphically displays the various profit/loss scenarios that exist.
As discussed in Chapter II, the profit sharing feature of the PUR system
enables activities to generate additional funds when they experience increased work-
load and to provide a pool of moneys with which to reward employees who have
contributed positively to increased productivity and efficiency. Similarly, NAVSUP
has a pool of funds with which it can fund other initiatives.
The four steps discussed above constitute the generic PUR process. The
next section will examine the specific features of the Procurement Cost Center.
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D. THE PROCUREMENT COST CENTER
NAVSUP INSTRUCTION 7000.21A defines the Procurement Cost Center as:
The Procurement Cost Center will resource all & M,N labor and non-labor
costs incurred by an activity in providing procurement services. It will be
funded on the basis of large and small purchase productive unit cost rates
multiplied by projected workload. Additions and withdrawals will be based
on actual quarterly completions.
The functions included in this cost center are large and small purchases, contract
administration actions pertaining to purchases, and procurement overhead costs.
Conceptually, the rate determination process employed in the Procurement Cost
Center involves the accumulation of all procurement & M,N labor and non-labor
costs, separation of these costs into large and small purchase categories and then
division of the category totals by respective productive unit totals. The end result
is a dollar per unit rate. In actuality, rates are determined by application of a series
of algorithms. Each algorithm will now be explained [Ref. 7:p. 27].
1. Procurement Overhead Costs
All costs experienced by NAVSUP field activities are recorded in cost
accounts (C/A). These accounts are nothing more than general accounting ledger
categories, assigned by headquarters, and maintained for field and headquarters
management use. The cost accounts assigned to the Procurement Cost Center
include the following:
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Cost Distribution Category Cost Account (C/A)
Large Purchase Buying 271
A








Procurement overhead costs accumulated in cost account (C/A) 271
E
are not discretely identified with either large or small purchases and thus must in
someway be allocated to these categories in order to facilitate proper costing of
the procurement function. This is accomplished by allocating procurement over-
head costs in accordance with the NAVSUP INSTRUCTION 7000.21 A prorating
algorithms.
a. Overhead Allocated to Large Purchase
Procurement overhead allocated to large purchase operations is de-
termined by application of the following algorithm:
21\A 4- 27ir*
P = PROCUREMENT OVERHEAD =—-
—
nr7 , n n„,„ nn , „ x 271£271A + 2715 + 271C + 271D
(3.1)
where costs are distributed into the previously defined cost accounts.
b. Overhead Allocated to Small Purchase
Procurement overhead allocated to small purchase operations is de-
termined by application of the following algorithm:
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(3.2)
Again, where the cost accounts are as previously defined.
2. Large Purchase Cost Per Productive Unit
Total large purchase cost per productive unit is determined by application
of the following algorithm:






L = Total large purchase & M,N labor and non- labor recorded in C/A
271A.
C = Total contract administration & M,N labor and non-labor recorded
in C/A 271C.
P = Procurement overhead cost allocated to large purchase.
A = Total productive units as reported in the Procurement Management
Reporting System (PMRS) report DF106.
The PMRS is a NAVSUP system through which all procurement actions
are reported. Monthly, field activities categorize and total all completed purchase
actions. They then report these totals to headquarters using either a DD350 (large
purchase, greater than $ 25,000) report or a DD1057 (small purchase) report.
DF106, a computer program in PMRS, automatically calculates and dis-
plays large purchase productive units based on input from the field and application
of a productive unit matrix.
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The productive unit matrix classifies each large purchase action, e.g., De-
livery Order, Sealed Bid, Definitized Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA), Negotiated
Competitive Supply, etc., and assigns productive units to that action. The number
of productive units assigned is based on the amount of work required to complete
the action when compared to the basic delivery order. For example, NAVSUP has
determined that the basic delivery order requires 13 man-hours to complete and is
thus assigned one productive unit. They then estimate that a negotiated compet-
itive supply contract less than $ 100,000 requires 39 man-hours to complete. This
action is then assigned three productive units (i.e., 39/13 = 3). A complete large
purchase productive unit matrix can be found in Appendix C.
3. Small Purchase Cost Per Productive Unit
Total small purchase cost per productive unit is calculated as follows:





S = Total small purchase h M,N labor and non-labor recorded in C/A
271B.
C = Total purchase administration k, M,N labor and non-labor recorded
in C/A271D.
P = Procurement overhead cost allocated to small purchase.
A = Total small purchase productive units.
Total small purchase productive units are calculated from each activity's
monthly DFPUR57 report. The DFPUR57 report is a summary report of each
activity's small purchase productivity as reported by DD1057 inputs. Added to
or subtracted from DFPUR57 reported productive units are NAVSUP calculated
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quarterly bonus units. These units are added or subtracted from the field activity
total depending upon whether the activity's ratio of procurement requests to ac-
tions completed for the quarter has increased or decreased as compared to previous
quarters [Ref. 7:p. 30].
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has detailed the generic PUR process. It has also defined and then
explained the specific details of the Procurement Cost Center. The next chapter will
examine the positive and negative impacts of PUR as well as examine and analyze
problems with the PUR process and the Procurement Cost Center algorithms.
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IV. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPACTS -
PROCESS AND ALGORITHM PROBLEMS
AND SOLUTIONS
A. GENERAL
The previous three chapters have defined PUR, explained the PUR process and
Procurement Cost Center algorithms, and have provided the reader with an under-
standing of PUR's predecessor system, the fixed workyear-cost funding methodology.
With this as a foundation, it is now possible to examine the positive and negative
impacts of the PUR process. Also, problems with the PUR process and Procure-
ment Cost Center algorithms can now be understood. This chapter will address two
specific areas. First, PUR's impact on user activities will be discussed. This will
be followed by an examination of the problems associated with the PUR process
and Procurement Cost Center algorithms. As each problem is examined, a possi-
ble solution, or a means by which the process or algorithms can assist in problem
resolution at field contracting activities will be presented.
B. POSITIVE IMPACTS
In order to determine the positive impacts or benefits of PUR, each person
interviewed was asked the following question: From his or her perspective (field
activity or headquarters), what, if any, have been the benefits or positive impacts of
PUR? All persons interviewed were able to cite at least one benefit or positive impact
resulting from PUR. The following is a summary of the major benefits reported by
the interviewees.
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• PUR is quantifiable,
• PUR enables the user to examine operations from a business perspective,
• PUR provides a common unit of measurement for all activities,
• PUR enables field activities to generate and use profits,
• PUR clearly defines employee responsibilities,
• PUR can be used as an employee incentive device.
Each of the above listed benefits will now be examined in greater detail.
1. Quantifiable
The quantifiable nature of PUR was described as a benefit by seven of
the fourteen persons interviewed. Interviewees explained that because PUR has as
its foundation unit rates, counts of workload completed, etc., that activities are
better able to manage workload variations. For example, the activities can quan-
tifiably justify staffing requirements, overtime requests, material and equipment
requirements, and so forth. Additionally, activities can now analyze workload and
production trends with a greater detail than was ever possible in the past. Un-
der PUR, quantifiable evidence can now be presented and used, where previously,
subjective opinion was the norm.
2. Examine Operations From a Business Perspective
Five interviewees noted that PUR now forces field activities to examine
their operations from a business perspective. As one interviewee put it, "... (PUR)
has made both military and civilian managers pay attention to the efficiencies of
their operation . .
.
now, (as in) retail operations you must be attuned to the bottom
line, making the system pay." [Ref. 8]
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Under PUR, activities can no longer focus solely on completing the mis-
sion at all cost. Cost is now a very important consideration. From both a field and
headquarters perspective, field activities that operate profitably and still complete
the mission are more desirable than those activities that complete the mission, but
do so at higher cost. For this reason, having the ability to examine operations from
a business perspective is a definite benefit at the headquarters level.
3. Common Unit of Measurement
Having common units of measurement with which all field activities gauge
workload and productivity was seen as a benefit by virtually all the field personnel
interviewed, as well as those at headquarters. Prior to PUR, field activities all
measured anticipated workload, work in process, and work completed, differently.
Prior to PUR, NAVSUP had never issued definitive guidance and allowed significant
deviation with regard to the way activities measured performance. PUR introduced
commonalty. Under PUR, activities could now be compared on an even basis as
to workload, costs, and productivity. Backlogs could now be compared from one
activity to the next. True comparisons could be made. Additionally, shifts in
workload could now be contemplated by headquarters.
4. Field Activities Generate and Use Profits
As was discussed in Chapter II, the designers of PUR envisioned a system
that would provide field activities a mechanism with which they could internally
fund workload increases. PUR, through its profit sharing mechanism, makes this
a reality. When coupled with NAVSUP's willingness to let each individual activity
freely use internally generated profits, this PUR feature becomes a readily identified
benefit of the system. Time and money are saved since activities no longer need to
request additional funds from headquarters as additional funds are automatically
provided in the quarterly budget adjustment. Also, because headquarters allows
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activities flexibility with the use of profits, activities can make expenditures which
otherwise would have been precluded. For example, activities may upgrade facilities
by installing/remodeling lunchrooms, purchasing modular office furniture, installing
desktop computers, and painting exterior buildings. Previously, funds for these
expenses would have been requested from headquarters as a supplement to the
activity's fixed budget. PUR allows the activities to generate funds and then to use
these funds as necessary.
5. Defines Employee Responsibility
Four of the fourteen persons interviewed identified the fact that PUR
clearly defines each employees responsibility under the system as a benefit. As was
noted by one interviewee, activities can, through the use of PUR phasing plans,
break down required output to the division, branch, and even the individual buyer
[Ref. 9]. Additionally, because PUR is quantifiable, i.e., each action is assigned a
specific number of productive units, activities can readily assign and gauge individ-
ual performance against predetermined performance goals. Employee performance
standards can be written based on PUR productivity goals [Ref. 10].
6. Employee Incentive Device
Coupling the fact that PUR clearly defines employee responsibilities and
the fact that PUR gives each command the flexibility to use profits as they see fit,
an employee incentive device has resulted. Employees are told up front exactly what
is expected of them. If they exceed their assigned goals and the command shows a
profit, the employee is rewarded with a share of the profits. As was noted in Chapter
II, this was one of the original purposes of PUR and in fact, at least two commands
have used a portion of their profits for this purpose [Ref. 11]. This was recognized
as a benefit of the system by five interviewees.
27
In summary, PUR has some very readily identifiable benefits. These
benefits are such that they help both management and employees who work under
PUR. The next section will examine the negative impacts of the PUR process.
C. NEGATIVE IMPACTS
Each interviewee was asked the following question: What were the negative
impacts of PUR? As was the case with the benefits or positive impacts, all intervie-
wees could cite at least one negative impact resulting from PUR. The interviewee's
responses fell into two general categories: 1) negative impacts resulted in uncer-
tainty with respect to the overall operation of the field activity, and 2) negative
impacts, or more specifically problems, with the process or algorithms. This section
will address those impacts which have resulted in uncertainty. The following sec-
tions will address the specific problems of the process and Procurement Cost Center
algorithms.
1. Impacts Resulting in Uncertainty
The two common negative impacts (situations) that resulted in uncer-
tainty with respect to the overall operation of the field activity are, first, inconsis-
tency of PUR payouts, and secondly, PUR's total emphasis on quantity of output
produced. Each of these situations will now be discussed.
a. Inconsistency of PUR Payouts
Several interviewees relayed to the researcher their concerns with
respect to the inconsistent manner with which headquarters makes payouts under
the PUR system [Refs. 4, 8, 10, 11]. Concerns generally revolved around the fund-
ing uncertainty that resulted from headquarter's inconsistency in making payouts.
Concerns were the greatest when, as was the case in FY86, 87, and 88, no fourth
quarter payouts were made to any field activity [Ref. 11]. (It should be noted that
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no payouts were made the last two quarters of FY88. In effect PUR was suspended
by headquarters during this entire period.) The feelings of the field activities re-
garding this issue are best illustrated by the following quote obtained from a field
activity comptroller.
NAVSUP has been consistent in not giving payouts in the last quarter ... we
still go through the motions, make the reports, but there is no benefit other
than we are keeping track. If we are going to have the program, then we
should implement the program. If they (NAVSUP) are not going to make the
program work the way it was intended, plus and minus as far as money, then
we can do other things than (just) keep track of how many points we can
generate. [Ref. 11]
As was noted in previous chapters, the ability of field activities to
generate and then use profits is central to the proper functioning of the PUR system.
Because PUR payouts are being made irregularly, field activity commanders are
uncertain with respect to their ability to fund their activity, and as a result, they
are severely constrained in their ability to manage. For example, the hiring of new
personnel, undertaking of additional workload, and the purchase of productivity
enhancing office equipment, all might have to be put on hold until the field activity
commander is certain that additional funds are forthcoming.
In summary, funding uncertainty resulting from inconsistent PUR
payouts is viewed as a significant negative impact resulting directly from the PUR
system.
b. Total Emphasis on Production
The main emphasis of the PUR system is production. This occurs
because it is through increased production that activities obtain additional profit.
Because of the system's heavy emphasis on production, quality of the output has
become secondary. This situation is viewed by virtually all interviewees as a signif-
icant negative impact of the PUR system As one interviewee explained, "There is
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a definite tendency (to push production) ... I do not know how to factor in quality
... it's too hard to work a PUR's payout into quality. Quality has to be checked by
other indicators." [Ref. 12]
Another interviewee also clearly made the point when he said, "
. . . (the emphasis is to) get it (the contract) awarded. Get what the customer wants.
Quality is secondary." [Ref. 13]
Because of the quantity emphasis, quality has become a secondary
goal. In the push to get more and more out, short cuts are taken, less time is devoted
to each action, and as a result mistakes are made. Evidence of quality decreases at
field activities, specifically in the activity's Procurement Cost Centers, can be found
in the Ellsworth Associates, Inc., (EAI), draft report on PUR. EAI noted a signifi-
cant increase in the number of contract modifications being issued (as a percent of
total actions) for 15 field activities studied during the years 1985-87, and after the
activities implemented PUR [Ref. 5:pp. 15-25]. This increase in contract modifica-
tions far exceeded the corresponding increase in regular procurement actions being
experienced and thus indicates a decrease in the quality of the original procurement
action being produced by the activities.
To summarize, the two negative impacts which result in uncertainty
with respect to the field activity's ability to operate are, the irregularity of PUR
payouts, and PUR's heavy emphasis on quantity resulting in quality degradation.
Responsibility for correction of these problems lies with NAVSUP headquarters.
NAVSUP can ensure consistent payouts by reserving funds early in the year, i.e.,
during the rate negotiation phase of the PUR process. The NAVSUP Comptroller
can fence funds for fourth quarter PUR payouts just as funds are set aside for
non-PUR activities or strategic plan initiatives.
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Addressing the quality issue is somewhat more difficult. NAVSUP
must develop outside of PUR, a system of quality indicators. The current sys-
tem measures quality through reports of Procurement/Administrative Lead Time
(PALT), backlogs, etc. However, these measurements are not part of the PUR sys-
tem. In addition, NAVSUP must ensure that Procurement Management Reviews
(PMRs), and other inspecting organizations, review in depth the quality of the
procurement actions being accomplished in the field.
The next two sections will address the problems associated with the
PUR process and the Procurement Cost Center algorithms.
2. Process Problems
Each interviewee was asked to address changes he/she would like to see in
the PUR process and why? The intent of this question was to draw from the intervie-
wees areas they viewed as problematic within the current PUR system. Responses
to this question were varied, however, there was a general consensus on a number of
points. Areas in which a majority of interviewees agreed included: forecasting work-
load under PUR, rate negotiations, availability of Management Information Systems
(MIS) to support PUR, staffing under the system, and finally, susceptibility of the
system to "gaming" . These areas will now be addressed individually.
a. Forecasting Workload Under PUR
Nine of the fourteen persons interviewed indicated that accurately
forecasting workload under PUR was a significant problem. Under the PUR system,
field activities receive funds from headquarters based on an estimate that may not
come to fruition. This forecast of funds amounts to the product of the number
of units to be produced times the negotiated rate. When forecasts of workload
are significantly different from actual workload being experienced, activity budgets
fluctuate. Because of fluctuating budgets, management becomes constrained. As
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is experienced with inconsistent PURs payouts, discussed in the previous section,
fluctuating budgets lead to management uncertainty.
The ability of the field activities to forecast their workload is depen-
dent on a number of factors. The primary factor is the reliability of the information
received from the field activity customers. For example, virtually all the field pro-
curement activities request input from their major customers regarding the number,
type, and estimated dollar amount of procurements to be processed in the upcom-
ing year. When the input received is accurate, the field activity has little problem
assigned personnel to complete the work. However, when customers of the field
activities submit bad input, possibly due to funding uncertainties at their own ac-
tivity, the field contracting activity can experience significant problems. Examples
include, extra personnel being recruited in anticipation of increased workload, or a
reorganization being initiated to facilitate better processing of the new work. This
results in the activity having to fund unnecessary personnel, or possibly, having to
live with less than an optimal organizational structure. Other factors affecting the
ability of field activities to accurately forecast workload include, the amount of funds
being held in reserve by various customers, unanticipated fleet operations, and even
fluctuating foreign currency exchange rates [Ref. 10].
Correcting an activity's inability to accurately forecast is both a
headquarters and activity function. Headquarters can provide field activities with
a frame of reference with regard to anticipated workload. They can give the field
historical workload summaries by activity and by groups of similar activities. The
field activity itself can develop its own historical workload data base, as well as
instituting a program of formal personal contacts with each of its major customers.
Working together with the customer, the field activity can better ensure the accuracy
of its workload projections.
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b. Rate Negotiations
As was addressed in Chapter III, verbal negotiations are used to
finalize each activity's productive unit rate. Normally, negotiations are attended by
only field activity commanding officers and the NAVSUP Comptroller and possibly
some NAVSUP support personnel (cost/functional managers). Activity functional
managers, e.g., Director, Procurement Department, do not attend. The absence of
field activity functional managers at rate negotiations is viewed as a problem with
the process. As one interviewee noted,
. . .rates are not negotiated between the functional sponsor, NAVSUP-02, and
us (the procurement shop), they are negotiated between NAVSUP-01 and our
Comptroller . . . rates are becoming more of what can we afford rather than
what does it cost. If we are serious about having this cost measurement system
and we know what is costs (to do the work), it does not serve any purpose to
ignore the functional manager and just let the comptroller's whack out dollars.
[Ref. 14]
Field activity functional managers believe that in order to make PUR
work as it was intended, they must actively participate in rate negotiations. They
believe that their expertise in these areas make them the most qualified to discuss
the costs of the particular function. It is believed that commanding officers and
comptrollers may be willing to sacrifice one particular area in order to gain a better
position in another. Therefore, field activity functional mangers believe they should
negotiate their own rates and once rates are agreed upon, involve the comptrollers.
NAVSUP, in its effort to improve the operation of the PUR pro-
cess, could bring into the rate negotiation process the field activity functional man-
agers. The comptrollers could still make the decisions. However, with the functional
managers in attendance, irresponsible actions could be identified early and lobbied
against.
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c. Management Information Systems (MIS)
Management Information Systems (MIS) used at field contracting
activities were viewed as inadequate with respect to PUR. This was particularly
true in the large purchase area (greater than $ 25,000).
As discussed in the previous chapter, large purchase actions are re-
ported to headquarters via DD350 reports. Headquarters, using the PMRS DF106
computer program, validates these actions and calculates the number of productive
units to be credited to the field activity. The preparation and transmission of re-
ports and the running of this program takes time and resources. It is common for
field activities to not know how many large purchase productive units they produced
in a month until well into the following month. This fact is simply due to a lack
of automation and over-reliance on manual data gathering and calculation. This
lack of management information constrains managements ability to manage. It can
result in the activity constantly having to play catch-up. For example, if the activity
produced less than its phasing plan called for and it does not discover this fact until
well into the following month, immediate corrective action may be necessary. Pos-
sibly because the corrective action was initiated late, the activity may never correct
the problem.
This lack of management flexibility has prompted many activities to
develop their own MIS system. The systems being developed provide more timely
information and thus facilitate prompt corrective action when required. Unfortu-
nately, no commonalty exists between the individual field activity systems. NAV-
SUP could help by examining the best of these field systems and, as they have done
with other systems, export it to all other field activities.
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d. Staffing Under PUR
Inherent in PUR is the assumption that field activities can rapidly
expand or contract their workforce as required by a fluctuating workload. While this
may be true in cost centers such as Inventory Control and Warehousing, managers
of the Procurement Cost Center believe this to be an invalid assumption.
The nature of the work done within a field activity's Procurement
Cost Center, particularly large purchase acquisitions, is very complex and involves
a limited amount of repetitive work. Additionally, the work is strictly governed by
a myriad of complex laws and regulations. As a result, personnel hired to perform
this work require extensive amounts of training. Often, it takes several years for
a GS-1102, Procurement Specialist, to become proficient in all aspects of the job
for which he was hired [Ref. 10]. Temporary workers and intermittents cannot be
expected to satisfactorily complete the work. Also, activities find that it is virtually
impossible to hire a previously trained procurement specialist. This is particularly
true at activities located in high cost-of-living areas [Ref. 8]. In summary, the
nature of the job is such that it is not conducive to a rapid expansion of the work
force.
Another staffing related problem inherent with the PUR process is
the possibility of a command entering a personnel "death spiral". This a situation
where, because an activity fails to produce as planned, it receives less funds than it
budgeted for a particular quarter. As a result of receiving less funds, it is forced to
reduce its staffing through retirements or other attritions. Because it then has fewer
productive workers, it again produces less than originally planned, which leads to
further budget cuts. Theoretically, the cycle could continue until the activity no
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longer has the funds or personnel to continue to operate [Ref. 15]. No intervie-
wees reported that their commands were in this situation, although all agreed that
without careful management, the "death spiral" was a very real possibility.
Correcting staffing problems will be very difficult. Possible remedies
include increasing the grade levels of the workforce with the intent of increasing the
pool of possible workforce candidates, and where possible, making maximum use of
creative staffing, e.g., job sharing.
e. PUR Gaming
The gaming or manipulating of PUR productive units was viewed
as a problem by all interviewees. Gaming was viewed as a way to circumvent the
PUR process. It was seen as a way to ensure achievement of planned productive
units and thus, a means of guaranteeing profits.
Gaming productive units is a relatively simple process. For exam-
ple, as a command approaches the end of a month, it informally counts the number
of productive units completed to date. If it finds itself behind plan, it can simply
redirect its effort toward simpler and faster types of actions, which will enable it to
rapidly boost its completed productive unit count. An example of this type of gam-
ing would include, the shifting of production emphasis away from time consuming
negotiated competitive supply acquisitions to more easily completed delivery order
type acquisitions. While delivery orders receive less PUR units than negotiated sup-
ply acquisitions, units lost can be more than made up in volume. Another example
of gaming involves the breaking down of large contracts, e.g., $ 50,000 Household
Good contracts, into lesser value contracts with the intent of receiving multiple PUR
units (since units are based on number of contracts awarded).
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Whatever the form, gaming, neutralizes PUR. It invalidates PURs'
profit/loss mechanism and lessens the credibility of activity comparisons made under
PUR.
Gaming will not be eliminated. It can, however, be controlled by
careful analysis of report inputs received from the field. Coupling thorough analysis
with possible reprimands of offenders should curb the desire to cheat.
The next section will address those problems more specifically asso-
ciated with the Procurement Cost Center algorithms.
3. Algorithm Problems
In order to identify the problems interviewees had with the Procurement
Cost Center algorithms, each interviewee was asked, What changes in the Procure-
ment Cost Center algorithms would he/she like to see made, and why? Responses
to this question again varied, however, three predominate areas were noted. The
areas noted most troublesome or problematic were: first, the limited range of matrix
values; specifically, the exclusion of credit for contract administration actions. Sec-
ond, the fact that only completed actions are counted when calculating productive
units. Finally, the appropriateness of the 13 standard man-hour productive unit
base. These areas will now be examined in detail.
a. Range of Matrix Values
Interviewees noted that the range of matrix values used in the pro-
curement algorithms was incomplete. This was particularly true with respect to the
contract administration function. Currently, PUR gives no credit to an activity for
completing any contract administration type action, e.g., contract terminations. At
many activities, depending on the type of procurement actions being completed,
this type of work can account for a significant portion of the overall workload.
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Activities are now funding contract administration work out of mon-
eys received for other credited work, i.e., small purchase. It is believed that as the
rates for the other work are squeezed, activities will cut contract administration with
the intent of remaining within budget [Ref. 4]. Cutting contract administration can
cause an activity to experience a decrease in quality. This situation appears to have,
in fact, occurred. As was noted in the draft EAI report on PUR, there appears to be
a direct relationship between the level of contract administration performed at an
activity and the quality of output produced. With the implementation of PUR, EAI
has noted a decrease in the ratio of hours spent in contract administration (as com-
pared to total operations) and a simultaneous increase in contract modifications and
correcting actions [Ref. 5:p. 29]. Thus, the conclusion follows that cutting contract
administration adversely affects quality.
Another problem with the range of values contained in the matrix
involves cancellation actions. Currently, no command receives credit for cancella-
tions initiated by customer activities. The moneys spent on the procurement, i.e.,
wages, materials, etc., must be absorbed for work completed to date. No credit is
given and no moneys are received for the work done. As one interviewee noted,
. . . it's frustrating. You go all the way through to time of award and the
customer comes back and says, "I can't give you that extra money, you've got
to cancel it." You've made all the effort, 99.9 percent has gone in there, and
you do not get any credit. It does not show up as a PUR. [Ref. 10]
Receiving no credit for canceled procurements not only deprives com-
mands of PUR credit and therefore operating funds, but it also can penalize indi-
vidual workers. Worker performance is gauged by PUR units produced. Under
the current PUR structure, workers are penalized by not receiving credit for work
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performed. A buyer may have expended significant amounts of time working a pro-
curement, and then, because of reasons beyond the buyer's control, it is terminated.
Steps are already being taken to correct these problems. NAVSUP
is developing plans to include cancellations in the algorithms for FY89. Also, it has
under study the feasibility of modifying the PUR algorithms to provide credit for
contract administration work.
b. Completed Actions
The PUR algorithms currently credit only those actions which field
activities report as completed. Work in process (WIP), receives no credit. This
situation, related to the range of the matrix problems previously discussed, is also
viewed as a problem.
Many procurements, such as negotiated competitive supply contracts
or negotiated sole source procurements, can involve months of work to complete.
Often, many specific actions are required by law or regulation before the final docu-
ments can be signed and the procurement finalized. Also, changing circumstances,
e.g., unexpected funding increases or decreases, negotiation stalemates, requirements
changes, etc., can prolong the time it takes to formalize a contract. It is not uncom-
mon, therefore, for a procurement to be initiated in one month or quarter only to
have it finalized months or even quarters later. Because PUR does not recognize the
procurement action in process, field activities must absorb the costs of WIP until
the individual procurement is complete. When reported, the activity is then given
PUR credit and depending on the total units completed during this time period,
profits may be awarded or funds may be recaptured, depending on the plan. Activ-
ities view the burden of having to fund WIP as a significant problem of the current
Procurement Cost Center algorithms.
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This problem could be rectified by expanding the productive unit
matrix. Major efforts, e.g., negotiated competitive supply contracts, could be broken
down into component parts. It should be noted however, that to implement this
expanded matrix, significantly more manual tracking and recording of work would
have to be accomplished.
c. Standard Man-Hour Base
The large purchase PUR algorithm uses a NAVSUP specified stan-
dard productive unit base of 13 hours, which equates to completion of one delivery
order. One delivery order is in turn assigned one productive unit. All other pro-
curement actions are measured against this base. For example, NAVSUP estimates
that it takes 39 man-hours to complete a negotiated competitive supply contract,
less than $ 100,000. For this type of procurement, it assigns three productive units,
(i.e., 39/13 = 3). All the contract types listed in the large purchase productive unit
matrix, Appendix C, have been determined through this methodology.
Personnel interviewed at the various field activities question the ap-
propriateness of the 13 hour standard. Differences in activity staffs, particularly
grade levels, and differences in customer input into the purchase request, are cited
as reasons why a system wide standard should not be used. Interviewees cited exam-
ples of situations where many more hours were required to complete a procurement
than was allowed for by the standard, e.g., a sealed bid procurement which required
months to complete vice the allowed 39 hours [Ref. 8]. Evidence does exist, however,
that substantiates the 13 hour standard. EAI studies of the standard, conducted at
14 field contracting activities, indicates that a sample wide average number of hours
required to complete a delivery order is 12.67, with a standard deviation of 1.63.
Also, EAI determined that the average number of hours to complete one productive
unit of work in all other categories of the large purchase matrix was 11.58 hours,
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with a standard deviation of .88 [Ref. 5:p. 8]. This evidence would indicate the
validity of the 13 hour standard.
Empirical evidence indicates that the standard man-hour base is not
a problem. NAVSUP could, however, quell some of the remaining uncertainty by
publishing the final EAI report validating the standard.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed and discussed the positive and negative impacts of
PUR. It has also, examined the problems inherent in the PUR process and those in
the Procurement Cost Center algorithms. Possible solutions to the various problems
have also been presented. The final chapter will summarize the results of the research





The Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) has, in response to an in-
creasingly constrained financial resource environment, developed and implemented
the Productive Unit Resourcing system (PUR). This zero based resource allocation
system was designed to help both headquarters and field activity managers better
measure workload-funding-productivity relationships, provide better means of mak-
ing activity comparisons, and provide a methodology by which field activities and
headquarters could generate additional operating funds.
This research has critically assessed the PUR system outlined in NAVSUP
INSTRUCTION 7000.21 A as it is being used at Navy Field Contracting Activities
(NFCAs). The research has presented a review of the environment in which PUR
was developed. It has also presented an in-depth examination of the PUR process
and the Procurement Cost Center algorithms. Problems inherent in the process
and algorithms were also examined. Research data was collected from two primary
sources: 1) a review of current literature and 2) personal and telephone interviews
with headquarters and field activity personnel.
This research has discovered both positive and negative impacts that the PUR
system has had on NFCAs. Additionally, possible solutions to the negative impacts
(problems) have been examined and offered as a means by which PUR can be made
more applicable to field contracting activities.
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B. CONCLUSIONS
This research effort has led to several conclusions regarding the PUR system.
• Conclusion 1. The PUR system has positively impacted both headquarters and
Navy Field Contracting Activities.
Headquarters and field activities have benefited from PUR in that they now
have a quantifiable system which enables them to better analyze current operations.
In particular, PUR has forced management to examine their operations from a
business perspective with an eye towards the "bottom line". Additionally, PUR
has fostered commonalty. Now, all field activities are measuring and reporting
productivity from a common base. Valid comparisons between activities are now
possible. Finally, under PUR, activities can now generate and use profits as they
feel is necessary. No longer must activities request funds from NAVSUP every time
they wish to undertake a new project, upgrade facilities, or hire personnel.
• Conclusion 2. The PUR system has had some negative impacts on Navy Field
Contracting Activities.
The negative impacts of the PUR system are of two general types. The first
consists of those impacts which result in uncertainty with respect to the overall
operation of the field activity. This category includes budget uncertainty resulting
from inconsistent PUR payouts and uncertainty with respect to quality resulting
from PUR's total emphasis on production (contracts awarded). The second type of
negative impact relates directly to the problems inherent in the PUR process and
Procurement Cost Center algorithms. Negative impacts of this type include uncer-
tainty with respect to an activity's forecasted workload, concern over the validity of
rates negotiated without functional manager input, distress over a lack of adequate
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MIS support, staffing concerns, and concern over the system's susceptibility to gam-
ing. Also, included in this category are concerns over the adequacy of the range of
matrix values and uncertainty over the validity of the 13 hour standard man-hour
base.
• Conclusion 3. Both the PUR process and Procurement Cost Center algorithms
require modification in order to make the system more applicable to Navy Field
Contracting Activities.
In its current form PUR fails to achieve many of its original purposes because
field activities have been reluctant to support the system. To make PUR more
applicable to Navy Field Contracting Activities and thus obtain field activity sup-
port for the system, PUR's negative impacts must be eliminated or reduced. This
includes eliminating the uncertainties mentioned above, plus allowing functional
manager input into the rate determination process and correcting all other process
and algorithm problems.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
• Recommendation 1. NAVSUP eliminate all uncertainty with respect to incon-
sistent PUR payouts, particularly fourth quarter payouts.
NAVSUP could either, by fencing funds early in the fiscal year or through
temporary termination of PUR at the close of the third quarter of the fiscal year,
eliminate the uncertainty field activities have regarding fourth quarter operating
funds. By fencing funds early in the year, NAVSUP provides a signal to the field
activities showing total commitment to PUR and thus eliminates some of the payout
uncertainty. Alternatively, NAVSUP could terminate PUR at the end of the third
quarter of the fiscal year and fund activities via a separate funding methodology,
i.e., fixed level, during the fourth quarter. This too would improve the PUR process.
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• Recommendation 2. NAVSUP clarify its policy regarding quality of output
produced under PUR and develop appropriate quality indices for publication in
the PUR instruction.
As discussed in Chapter IV, because of PUR's quantity emphasis, quality of
output has become a secondary goal. NAVSUP must provide leadership in this area
by instilling in the field activities a desire to produce output of the highest pos-
sible quality while still achieving productivity goals. NAVSUP must clearly state
its policy with regard to quality, publish quality standards, and then monitor qual-
ity through appropriate monthly/quarterly reports and/or inspections and audits.
Possible quality indices NAVSUP could initiate include the number of contract ad-
ministration actions processed as a percent of total actions, number of customer
complaints received per month/quarter/year, etc.
• Recommendation 3. NAVSUP develop and make available to field activities
a data base containing historical workload summaries for each buying activity
and their major customers.
NAVSUP can, by developing a historical workload data base, help field ac-
tivities with workload projections. More accurate workload projections will in turn
stabilize the process during budget execution.
• Recommendation 4- NAVSUP encourage field activity functional managers to
attend and provide input into rate negotiations discussions.
The field activity functional managers are personnel who know best exactly
what it costs to perform any particular function. NAVSUP should utilize their
expertise when setting individual activity PUR rates.
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• Recommendation 5. NAVSUP should review the Management Information
Systems (MIS) being used by field activity managers in conjunction with PUR.
NAVSUP should pick the best of these systems and export it to all activities.
The MIS currently being used in the field activities is a hodgepodge of individ-
ually developed and maintained systems. By standardizing the system, NAVSUP
will attain management continuity and commonalty with respect to reports and
statistics available to all field activity managers.
• Recommendation 6. NAVSUP should issue a policy statement strictly prohibit-
ing the gaming of PUR statistics.
As discussed in Chapter IV, the gaming of PUR statistics, e.g., units com-
pleted, invalidates PURs profit/loss mechanism and lessens the credibility of ac-
tivity comparisons made under PUR. By issuing a strong policy statement against
gaming, NAVSUP will lessen the temptation to cheat.
In addition, NAVSUP could lessen gaming by vigorously monitoring monthly
activity reports. By noting and questioning irregularities, e.g., delivery orders in
excess of the historical norm, NAVSUP would pressure activities into reporting
valid PUR statistics.
• Recommendation 7. NAVSUP should expand the range of matrix values to
include credit for cancellation actions and provide credit for contract admin-
istration actions.
Credit for cancellation actions should be provided since in many cases signif-
icant amounts of work are expended on these procurements which are ultimately
canceled. If PUR is to accurately reflect the work actually done in an activity it
must, therefore, provide credit to cancellation actions. Similarly, unless NAVSUP is
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willing to risk severe quality degradations and lessening customer service support,
contract administration actions must also receive credit under PUR.
• Recommendation 8. NAVSUP should publish and distribute to all field activi-
ties the EAI report validating the 13 standard man-hour base.
NAVSUP could quell some of the uncertainty that currently exists involving
the validity of the standard man-hour base by publishing EAI's findings. The find-
ings, while not absolutely conclusive, do provide evidence indicating the validity of
the standard.
D. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In order to answer the research question, five secondary questions were estab-
lished. A summarization response to each question, secondary and then primary, is
now provided.
• Secondary Question 1. What was the PUR system and why was it developed
and implemented?
Chapters II and III provided the response to this question. As was discussed,
PUR is a resource allocation methodology. Central to this methodology is the
"zero base" budget concept. It is because PUR is zero based that it replaced its
predecessor system, the fixed workyear-cost funding methodology. As outlined in
Chapter III, the PUR process consists of four basic steps: 1) Rate Determination,
2) Performance Review, 3) Performance/Execution and, 4) Adjustment Calculation
and Processing.
• Secondary Question 2. W^hat have been the positive impacts/results of PUR
on NFCAs?
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The research discovered six positive impacts resulting from PUR:
— PUR is quantifiable,
— PUR enables the user to examine operations from a business perspective,
— PUR provides a common unit of measurement for all activities,
— PUR enables field activities to generate and use profits,
— PUR clearly defines employee responsibilities,
— PUR can be used as an employee incentive device.
• Secondary Question 3. What have been the negative impacts/results of PUR
on NFCAs?
The research discovered that the negative impacts of PUR fall into two general
categories: 1) negative impacts resulting in uncertainty with respect to the overall
operation of the field activity, and 2) negative impacts, or more specifically problems,
with the process or algorithms. Impacts resulting in uncertainty included budget
uncertainty resulting from PUR's total emphasis on quantity resulting in quality
degradation. Process and algorithm problems include uncertainty with respect to
an activity's forecasted workload, concern over the validity of negotiated rates, lack
of adequate MIS support, staffing and gaming concerns, and finally, concern over
the range of matrix values and adequacy of the standard man-hour base.
• Secondary Question 4- How might the PUR algorithms be modified to improve
PUR applicability at NFCAs?
As was discussed in Chapter IV, the PUR algorithms could be improved by
expanding the range of the matrix to include credit for cancellation actions and credit
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for contract administration actions. Additionally, the matrix could break down large
complex actions into component parts, thus, enabling activities to receive credit for
work in process.
• Secondary Question 5. How might the PUR process be modified to enhance
PUR applicability at NFCAs?
The researcher proposed a number of possible ways the process might be mod-
ified to enhance its applicability. Possible modifications include development and
use of historical workload data bases to enhance forecasting, inclusion of field activ-
ity functional managers in the rate negotiation discussions, and implementation of a
standard field activity Management Information System. Also, it was recommended
that NAVSUP develop and implement a strict "gaming" policy.
• Primary Research Question. What have been the positive and negative im-
pacts of the Navy's Productive Unit Resourcing (PUR) system as applied to
the Procurement/Contracting Department ofNavy Field Contracting Activities
and how might the system be modified to improve its application?
Secondary questions taken in the aggregate provide the response to the primary
research question. As this research has shown, both positive and negative impacts
exist. Also, the research indicates a need for modification of both the process and
Procurement Cost Center algorithms.
E. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH
Due to the changing nature of the PUR system, and in light of the recom-
mendations made in this study, it is recommended that a revaluation of PUR be
conducted periodically over the next few years. Emphasis of further study should
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include the development and implementation of the contract administration matrix
values, evaluation of progress made in implementing a standard MIS system, and a
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LARGE PURCHASE PRODUCTIVE UNIT MATRIX
STANDARD PRODUCTIVE
CONTRACT TYPE MAN-HOURS UNIT WEIGHTS
Delivery Orders / GSA / Other Agencies 13 1
Sealed Bids 39 3
Unpriced BOA Orders 13 1
Initial Placement of BOA's 26 2
Contracts & IOTC's Less Than $25K
DEFINITIZED BOA ORDERS
$25K to Less Than $100K
$100K to Less Than $500
K
$500K to Less Than $1M
$1M to Less Than $10M
$10M and Greater
NEGOTIATED COMPETITIVE SUPPLY
$25K to Less Than $100K
$100K to Less Than $500K
$500K to Less Than $1M




$25K to Less Than $100K
$100K to Less Than $500
$500K to Less Than $1M



















CONTRACT TYPE MAN-HOURS UNIT WEIGHTS
NEGOTIATED SOLE SOURCE / 8a
/ NONPROFIT / EDUCATION / UTILITIES
$25K to Less Than $100K
$100K to Less Than $500K
$500K to Less Than $1M
$1M to Less Than $10M
,
$10M and Greater
NOTES: Productive units were calculated by dividing the standard man-hours for
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